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STIRRING MUDDLED WATERS: ARE PHYSICIANS
WITH HOSPITAL MEDICAL STAFF PRIVILEGES
CONSIDERED EMPLOYEES UNDER
TITLE VII OR THE ADA ACT WHEN ALLEGING AN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIM?
MichaelR. Lowe*

INTRODUCTION
Hospital medical staff privileges can be a crucial component of a
physician's medical practice. Because physicians often need access to a
hospital's clinical facilities and equipment in order to practice within their
area of medical specialty, or even simply to treat patients, many physicians
depend upon their hospital medical staff and clinical privileges for their
financial and professional well-being. Typically, physicians gain access to
such facilities only when a hospital grants them medical staff privileges,
Consequently, in an increasingly competitive health care market, a denial
or termination of a physician's staff privileges can be both professionally
and financially devastating. Because of this economic reality, physicians
often contest hospital decisions to terminate their staff privileges through
private administrative hearings, legal action, or both.
Conversely, hospitals have a paramount interest in maintaining and
ensuring the quality of care provided by their medical staffs, Physicians,
who do not meet the standard of care established by their host hospital,
may find themselves the subject of an adverse staff privileges
determination. Hospitals base adverse medical staff privileges decisions on
a number of grounds, including a physician's inability to work and get
along with others,' failure to maintain adequate medical malpractice

" Associate, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Atlanta, Georgia. BS, United State, Naval Academy,
1988; MA., Georgetown University, 1989; J.D., University of Alabama School of La%,, 199G
The author would like to thank Professors Ronald Turner and William S Breahker, 111 of the
University ofAlabana School of Law, as well as Robert R. Coleman, D,O., J D, for their inaluab!z
insight and assistance.
' See eg., Everhart v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist No. 2,757 F2d 1567 (5th Cir 1985), Ro:5 v
William Beaumont Hosp., 67S F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich, 198S),
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insurance coverage or to meet proper record keeping requirements, 3 lack
of professional competence or qualifications, 4 and geographic proximity of

a physician's residence to a hospital.'

These grounds for adverse staff

privileges decisions have been challenged by physicians who claim they are
based on pretext.
Physicians have responded to adverse staff privileges determinations
with a variety of legal causes of action, including antitrust theories,

procedural and substantive due process claims, breach of contract actions,
defamation lawsuits, federal civil rights actions, and intentional interference
with contractual or business relations claims. Physicians have also relied
upon federal employment statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VII"), 6 when challenging adverse medical staff privileges
decisions. As a result, over the past two decades there have been a
proliferation of federal employment discrimination claims alleging racial,

sexual, national origin, or disability discrimination in staff privileges
decisions.
When adjudicating the physicians' claims, courts have applied federal
employment statutes to the independent contractor type relationship that

exists between physician and hospital once a physician obtains staff
privileges. In doing so, the federal courts have been forced to struggle

with the issue of whether a physician with staff privileges is an employee
under federal employment statutes.7

2 See e.g., Foster v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 227 Cal, App. 3d (1991); Courtney v.

Shore Memorial Hosp., 584 A.2d 817 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
See e.g., Tabora v. Gottlieb, No. 92 C 8179, 1995 WL 121567 (N.D. 11L Feb. 15, 1995),
4 See e.g., Rao v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 488 N.E.2d 685 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986),
See e.g., Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp., 673 F. Supp. 1367 (D. Del. 1987) (stating that a hospital
bylaw required physicians with active staff privileges to maintain a residence within 12 miles of
hospital).
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e etseq. (1988).
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988). It should be noted that Title VII provides that "a person
claiming to be aggrieved," a term that could very well encompass more than just erployees, can bring
employment discrimination claims against employers.
This provision may have significant
implications for the analysis of staff privileges cases involving employment dis-rimination claims,
However, the inclusion of such analysis is beyond the current scope of this pape-.
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In most hospitals, physicians with active medical staff privileges are
not considered employees, but rather independent contractors.s
Historically, attempts to challenge medical staff terminations under Title
VII were dismissed due to the lack of an employment relationship between
physician and hospital.9 Recently however, courts have held hospitals
accountable under Title VII despite finding the physician plaintiff was not
an employee of the hospital.'"
As a result of this recent shift in legal precedent, the issue of whether
a staff physician is an employee of a hospital for purposes of the federal
employment discrimination statutes is important for three reasons. First,
federal court decisions concerning this issue have reached significantly
different conclusions, not only throughout individual United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals, but also within the circuits themselves, There is a
marked split among the courts concerning, not only the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between a hospital and a staff physician,
but also with regard to how to determine whether such a relationship
exists. At this time, there is little consistency among the federal courts in
this area, making it difficult for courts and litigants to interpret and apply
the existing law.
Second, the advent of managed care in the health care industry, has
caused changes in many of the traditional relationships between
physicians, hospitals, and health insurance entities. Insurers, physicians and
hospitals are often intertwined in complex business entities, contractual
arrangements, and financial risk-sharing agreements. Under the guise of
"economic credentialing," managed care entities exclude physician
providers from their networks based on a physician's economic
performance in order to increase efficiency and reduce costs. Physicians
are beginning to challenge these decisions, in what are known as "provider
exclusion" cases.
Although an employment relationship typically exists between a
physician and a managed care entity in certain types of networks such as
' Leon S. Conlon,PeerReviewand Public Poli;,19. LOY. U. CMl, LJ. 1237, 1253-54 (Summer

1988).
SId.
See e.g.,Pardazi v. Cullman Medical Ctr., 838 F.2d 1155 (1 th Cir. 198S); De v St Jo:ph's
Hosp., 788 F2d 411 (7th Cir. 1986).
10
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a staff-model health maintenance organization ("HMO"), the relationship
between a physician and other managed care entities such as a preferred
provider organization ("PPO"), an independent practice association
("IPA") model HMO, or a group-model HMO, is more likely to resemble
the independent contractor type of relationship present in staff privilege
arrangements between doctors and hospitals. Thus, as a starting point for
analyzing managed care credentialing decisions, lawyers representing
excluded physicians and managed care entities alike are turning to the
extensive, yet inconsistent and confusing case law, that has arisen out of
medical staff privileges litigation."
Third, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
('HCQIX') 2 provides immunity from damages to members of professional
review bodies in staff privileges cases, but does not provide immunity to
actions commenced under state and federal civil rights stalutes 3 This is
a matter of considerable importance not only because of the racial, sexual,
and national origin pluralism of the average hospital's active medical staff, 4
but also because HMOs and group practices that conduct some type of
formal review process can meet the qualifications for HCQ1(A immunity.I s
Thus, a physician plaintiff who is a member of a protected class and who
successfully proves discrimination by a hospital in a staff privileges
decision, or by a managed care entity in a provider exclusion decision,
might recover damages from the hospital or managed care entity. A
physician's employment discrimination claim, however, has no merit unless
the physician can first prove he had an employment relationship with the
hospital that terminated the doctor's staff privileges, or the managed care
entity that excluded the provider.
The purpose of this article is to examine the issue of whether a
physician with medical staff privileges at a hospital is an employee of the

" Mark Hall & William S. Brewbaker, M11,
Health Care CorporateLaw, MA',NAGED CAPY, § 6.5
(forthcoming 1996).
12 42 U.S.C.A. § 11111 etseq. (1995).
13 42 U.S.C.A. § 1111 1(a)(1)(D) (1995). (stating that immunity from damages for professional

review decisions "shall not apply to damages under any lav of the United States or any State relating
to the civil rights ofany person or persons, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c
et seq. and the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. 1981 et seq.")
'4 Conlon, supra note 9, at 1253.
s 42 U.S.CA. § 11 151(4)(A)(ii) (1995).
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hospital and, in doing so, to focus on staff privileges cases involving Title
VII of the Civil rights Act of 1964 and American with Disabilities Act
("ADA") 16 claims. To accomplish this objective, the paper will first
identify and evaluate several legal theories and tests that courts have relied
upon in determining whether the relationship between two parties is that
of employer-employee, or rather one of an independent contractor
providing services to a buyer. Next, the paper wil analyze the myriad of
staff privileges case law involving federal employment discrimination
claims under Title VII. Additionally, this paper will analyze several staff
privileges cases involving claims under Title I of the ADA17 against
hospitals that have terminated the privileges of a physician who alleges
having is a disability.
Finally, because this paper analyzes the existing law regarding
employment discrimination claims in staff privileges cases on a case-bycase basis, the analysis lends itself to the conclusion that federal courts
have reached a multitude of inconsistent holdings which create a confusing
legal framework in which to litigate such cases. As a general matter it
should be noted that although federal court decisions in staff privileges
cases involving federal employment discrimination claims are inconsistent,
it would be very difficult to develop and apply any one test or type of legal
analysis that would render consistent results in such cases. Medical staff
privileges cases involving employment discrimination claims are extremely
fact sensitive. Federal courts have applied different multi-factor balancing
tests to these fact-specific cases, but the application of these balancing tests
is inherently apt to produce inconsistent outcomes because it requires
courts to engage in a "weighing" process that is dependent upon objective
as well as subjective determinations.s While it seems that no one test or

16
17

42 U.S.CA § 12101 etseq. (1995).
See42 U.S.CA §§ 12111-12117 (1995). The Americans v.ith Disabilitica Act can-Izst offour

separate tifles or subehapters. Title I concerns disability discrimination in employment
"8 For example, a court applying an eleven factor balancing test could reazonably conclude that
after applying the eleven factors to the case at issue that six factors indicate the c-itence of an
employment relationship between the litigants, v.hile five factors do not indicate the e:istence of such
a relationship. A simple "weighing" of this result by the court should require it to determine that an
employment relationship exists. However, if controlling precedent had etablished that one of the
eleven factors was the dominant, or perhaps most important factor vithin the framework of the multifactor balancing tests analysis, and that particular factor was one of the five v, hich indicated that no
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legal framework is best suited to make the determination of whether an
employment relationship exists between a staff physician and hospital, this
paper ultimately proposes a new legal framework/test to use when making
such determinations. It does so by combining elements of already existing
tests with a number of factual and economic considerations that are
specific to relationships between physicians and the hospitals that grant
them staff privileges.
LEGAL THEORIES/TESTS FOR DISTINGUISHING
BETWEEN AN EMPLOYEE AND INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR
A cursory review of Title VII and the ADA suggests that neither statute
applies to medical staff privileges decisions because, physicians typically
are not considered to be employees of a hospital.19 Title VII provides in
pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
othenvise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.2"
Title VII further provides that an employer "means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year," 21 and that an employee "means an individual
1
employed by an employer."22

employment relationship existed between the parties, the court might be compelled to make a
subjective determination that no relationship eists.
19 Kevin E. Grady, Current Topics in Medical Staff Development and Credentialing,26 J
HEALTH & Hosp.L. 193, 195 (1993).
20
2'
22

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1988).
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The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement,
or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. "' Also, the ADA's
definitions of an employer and an employee are virtually identical to those
24
in Title V][.
Although hospitals easily fit within the Title VII and ADA definitions
of an "employer," the plain language of both statutes provides no express
indication that physicians with hospital staff privileges are employees of the
hospitals. In fact, courts generally treat doctors with staff privileges as
independent contractors rather than as employees.' Therefore, it appears
that neither statute's employment provisions apply to the relationship
between a staff physician and a hospital. A closer review of both statutes,
however, requires further analysis of the possibility of the existence of an
employment relationship between a hospital and a staff physician."
As defined in Title I of the ADA, the term "discriminate" includes in
pertinent part:
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee
ina way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such
applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant
or employee;
(2) participating in a contractual or other relationship that has the
effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or
employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this
subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship with an
employment or referral agency, labor union, an organization
providing fringe benefits to an employee of the covered entity, or
an organization providing training and apprenticeship programs);

2 42 U.S.CA § 12112(a) (1995).
14

See 42 U.S.CA §§ 12111(4)(5) (1995).

a See Conlon, supra note 9.
2 Jane C. Taber and Janna P. King, Caught in die Crossfire: Economic Credcntialing in die
Health Care War, 1994 DET.C.L. Rv.1179, 1201 (Winter 1994).
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(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration (A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of
disability; or
(B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject
to common administrative control...2'
These ADA provisions could encompass hospital actions taken as part
of a staff privileges determination, thereby allowing a terminated
physician to bring a claim for disability discrimination under Title I of the
ADA. For example, under section 12112(b)(3)of the ADA, a physician
might allege that a hospital utilizes "methods of administration that have
the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability, or that perpetuate the
discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative
control. ,28
Typically, hospital medical staffs are self-governing and routinely
administer, either in conjunction with a hospital's board of directors or
independently, the day-to-day interactions of the physicians on such staffs.
Moreover, medical staff members often make the initial decision to
terminate a physician's staff privileges and ad hoc review committees that
hear challenges to adverse medical staff privileges decisions, are usually
comprised of medical staff members. If a medical staff member or a
member of an ad hoc review committee member displays any animus
towards a disabled physician because of that physician's disability, a
decision to terminate a qualified physician with a disability could imply a
discriminatory intent by the medical staff and the hospital, thus creating
possible liability for the decision. In fact, the Joint Commission on
Accreditation for Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) recently alerted
hospitals that the ADA may prohibit certain kinds of questions generally
asked during physician credentialing procedures, and may require them to

27
28

42 U.S.C-A. § 12112(b) (1995) (emphasis added).
42U.S.C.A. § 12112(bX3) (1995).
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make accommodations for disabled physicians? Moreover, in the absence
of specific ADA case law on the question of whether the ADA can be
construed to apply to physicians who are non-employee members of a
medical staff, the California Medical Association has amended its model
medical staff applications and reapplication forms to comply with the
0
ADA-3
In addition, the legislative history of Title VII reveals Congress' aim
to permit the classification of professionals such as professors, doctors, and
lawyers, as employees.3 ' As part of the 1972 amendments to Title VII,
Congress considered, but did not include, a proposal that physicians and
surgeons employed by public or private hospitals be excluded from Title
Vii's protection. 2 In speaking out against the proposed amendment,
Senator Javits stated that:
One of the things that those discriminated against have resented the
most is that they are relegated to the position of the sawers of wood and
the drawers of water, that only the blue collar jobs and ditchdigging
jobs are reserved for them; and that though they built America, and
certainly helped build it enormously in the days of its basic
construction, they cannot ascend the higher rungs in professional and
other life. Yet his amendment would go back beyond decades of
struggle and of injustice and reinstate the possibility of discrimination
on grounds of ethnic origin, color, sex, religion just confined to
physicians or surgeons, one of the highest rungs of the ladder that any
member of a minority could attain and thus lock in and fortit, the idea
that being a doctor or surgeon is just too good for members of a
minority, and that they have to be subject to discrimination in respect
3
of it, and the Federal law will not protect them.
Congress' rejection of the proposal to exclude physicians from Title
VII's coverage, as well as Senator Javits' statement in support of this
' Robin Elizabeth Margolis, Client Memos and News!etters, 11 No 9 HE
wiHSF,%: 34 (Ozioar
1994).
30 Id.
31 Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F2d 793, 800 (2d Cir 196).
32 Id.
118 Cong. Rec. 3S02 (1972), quotedin Lucido v. Cravath, S%%
aine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123,
126 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, ISO (ND. I11 1975)o
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rejection, strongly suggests that physicians in certain circumstances can be

protected by Title VII. In order for a physician to bring a successful Title
VII employment discrimination claim in a staff privileges case, however,
the physician must first establish that a valid employment relationship
existed between himself and the hospital that terminated his privileges.
Arguably, hospital medical staff physicians may be considered

employees of a hospital. 4 In making such a determination, courts might
apply one of several different legal tests or frameworks, including one
developed by the IRS.3"

Thus, the method or legal theory that a

'

Taber and King, supra note 27, at 1201.
Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. According to the IRS, the following 20 factors tend to
indicate the existence of employment relationship:
35

(1) The hiring party requires the physician to comply with instructions about when, where,
and how he or she is to work.
(2) The hiring party provides some type of training for the physician.
(3) The physician's services are integrated into the hiring party's busines., operations.
(4) The physician personally renders services.
(5) The hiring party hires, supervises and pays assistants to the physician.
(6) The physician and the hiring party have a continuing relationship.
(7) The hiring party establishes set hours of work.
(8) The physician is required to work substantially full time.
(9) Work takes place on the premises of the hiring party or the hiring party provides free
office space to the physician.
(10) The physician is required to perform services in the order and sequence set by the hiring
party.
(11) The physician is required to submit regular or written reports.
(12) The physician is paid by the hour, week or month as opposed to being paid by the job or
on a straight commission.
(13) The hiring party pays for (or reimburses the physician for) the physician's business and/or
travel expenses.
(14) The hiring party furnishes medical equipment and supplies and other "significant tools"
to the physician.
(15) The physician is dependent on the hiring party for facilities at which to perform services.
A physician who has significant monetary investment in the equipment and facilities that
he or she uses in performing services is more likely to be an independent contractor.
(16) The physician has no ability to realize a profit or suffer a loss as a result of his or her
services.
(17) The physician may not work for more than one entity at a time.
(18) The physician's services are not marketed to the general public on a regular and consistent
basis. The physician does not have a private practice or business outside and independent
from the hiring party.
(19) The hiring party has the right to discharge or terminate the physician at any time, without
cause, for failure to obey instructions.
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federal court uses to determine whether the requisite employment
relationship exists in either a Title VII or an ADA staff privileges case is
critical.
While the IRS 20-factor test might provide some assistance in staff
privileges cases involving a federal employment discrimination claim, it is
perhaps better suited for cases involving tax issues. The IRS test was not
designed for use in employment discrimination litigation, but rather to aid
in the determination of whether a physician is a hospital employee for
federal income tax purposes. No one factor in the IRS test, in and of itself,
is determinative of whether a physician is an employee of a hospital,
Furthermore, like most multi-factor balancing tests, the IRS test is very
comprehensive and would be difficult to manage when the facts of a case
require a court to apply all twenty factors and balance a number of
contrary results in order to make a determination as to whether an
employment relationship exists.
Under the IRS test, a case might arise where several factors indicate
that a physician is a hospital employee, and several other factors indicate
that the physician is not an employee. For example, it is not unusual for a
hospital to require a physician with staff privileges to comply with
instructions about when, where and how the physician is to work within
the hospital (factor 1), and to submit regular or written reports (factor 11)
Physicians are often dependent upon hospital facilities to perform services
(factor 15), and hospitals often furnish medical equipment for physician use
(factor 14), as well as free office space for physician recruits (factor 9),
Each of these factors tends to indicate that an employer-employee
relationship exists between the physician and the hospital. However,
physicians routinely hold staff privileges at more than one hospital and
maintain their own independent practice (factor 17),
Hospitals rarely reimburse a physician's business and/or travel
expenses outside ofphysician recruitment activities (factor 13). Physicians

(20) The physician has the right to end his or her %vorkrelationship at any time without
incurring liability.
Additionally, the IRS requires that degree of direction and control must bz exerctsed ov er the ph .ieian
to create an employer/employee relationship. See Hall and Brcx.bAcr, mipra note 12 at § 5 11, 10,
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often have the ability to realize a profit or suffer a loss as a result of his or
her participation on a hospital medical staff (factor 16). And, while the
physician performs work on the hospital premises (factor 9), few
physicians work substantially full time for one hospital (factor 8), and
except for emergency room or on-call rotations, hospitals rarely dictate set
hours of work for medical staff physicians (factor 7). Each of these factors
tend to establish an independent contractor type of relationship between
the physician and hospital. All of these factors could be present in medical
staff privileges cases, and weighing or balancing these factors most likely
will not produce a conclusive determination of whether a medical staff
physician is an employee or independent contractor.36
In the area of employment discrimination, federal courts have
developed three tests to unravel the employee/independent contractor
conundrum. 7 The first test is the traditional common law test of agency
based on the employer's right to control an employee. This test is
commonly referred to as the "right to control" standard or test. Prior to
1947, courts distinguished an employee from an independent contractor by
using this common law test and determining the degree of control that an
alleged employer exercised over the work performance of an individual
whose status was in dispute.38 If the alleged employer had the right to
determine not only what work should be done, but also how it should be
done, the worker was deemed to be an employee."'
As an alternative to the "right to control" test, the United States
Supreme Court subsequently developed an "economic realities" test under
which persons are considered employees if they are, as a matter of
economic reality, dependent upon the business to which they render
service.4 ° In Bartels v. Birmingham, the Supreme Court held that the
"right to control" test was too narrow for use in deciding employee status
for the purposes of far reaching social legislation such as the Social

' In fact, research indicates that to date no federal court has applied the IRS 20-factor test ina staff
privileges case involving an employment discrimination claim for purposes of determining whether
an employment relationship existed between a physician and a hospital.
17 Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985).
38 EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32,36 (3d Cir. 1983).
3'See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704,714 n.8 (1947).
40 Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947).
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Security Act,41 and further stated that "[o]bviously control is
characteristically associated with the employer-employee relationship, but
in the application of social legislation employees are those who as a matter
of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render
service.""
In the wake of the Bartels decision, federal courts developed two
different standards to determine employee status for purposes of social
legislation.43 The standard used by the courts has come to depend upon
the type of legislation involved. Courts generally use the "economic
realities" test in cases involving the Fair Labor Standards Act"' ("FLSA").
In these cases, it is the degree of economic dependence of the alleged
employees on the business with which they are connected that indicates
employee status, 45 or the absence thereof.46
Other courts have applied a hybrid of the common law "right to
control" test and the "economic realities" test to determine employee status
for purposes of Title VII 4 These cases hold that it is the economic
realities of the relationship viewed in light of the common law principles of
agency, and the right of the employer to control the employee that are
determinative.4 S The factors that enter into a court's determination of
employee status under the hybrid standard are:
(1) the dnd of occupation, with reference to wyhether the work usually
is done under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a
specialist without supervision; (2) the skill required in the
particular occupation; (3) whether the "employer" or the
individual in question furnishes the equipment used and the place
42 U.S.C.A. § 301 etseq. (1993).
42 Bartels, 332 U.S. at 130.
4' EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32,36 (3d Cir. 1983).

29 U.S.C. § 201 etseq. (1988).
4S See e.g.,Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1931); Uzery v.Pilgrim

Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1303, 1311 (5th Cir.), cert denied,429 U S. 826 (1976)
"
Usery, 527 F.2d at 1311.
4 See e.g., Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F2d 337,341(1lth Cir.), rehearingdcnted, 679 F2d
253 (11th Cir.), cert denied,459 U.S. 874 (1982); Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F 2d 826, 831-32 (D.C.

Cir. 1979).
' EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F2d 32,37 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Cobb v- Sun Papzr-, Inc., 673
F.2d at 341).
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of work; (4) the length of time during which the individual has
worked; (5) the method of payment, whether by time or by the
job; (6) the manner in which the work relationship is terminated;
i.e., by one or both parties, with or without notice and
explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8)whether the
work is an integral part of the business of the "employer;" (9)
whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether
the "employer" pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention
of the parties.49
Additionally, the Spirides court stressed the importance of the employer's
right to control an employee's performance by stating that:
Consideration of all of the circumstances surrounding the work
relationship is essential, and no one factor is determinative.
Nevertheless, the extent of the employer's right to control the "means
and manner" of the worker's performance is the most important factor
to review here, as it is at common law and in the context of several
other federal statutes. If an employer has the right to control the
individual, not only as to the result to be achieved, but also as to the
details by which that result is achieved, an employer/employee
relationship is likely to exist."

Federal courts have generally refrained from using the broader

"economic realities" test in Title VII cases, and instead have employed the

hybrid test set forth in Spirides. In medical staff privileges cases, however,
a number of federal courts have applied the "economic realities" test."
While other federal courts have reverted to using the "right to control" or

agency test in medical staff privileges cases involving a Title VII claim, 2
a majority of the federal courts that have considered the issue of whether

a physician is an employee of a hospital in a Title VII medical staff
4' Spirides, 613 F.2d at 832.
'o Id. at 831-32.
"I See e.g., Ikpoh v. Central Dupage Hosp., No. 90 C 7146, 1993 WL 524817, at *15-16 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 15, 1993); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 765 F. Supp. 461,468 (N.D. 111.1991);
Ross v. William Beaumont Hosp., 678 F. Supp. 655, 675 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
" See e.g., Flanagan v. Aaron E. Henry Community Health Servs. Ctr., 876 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir.
1989).
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privileges case have employed the hybrid test from Spirides,3 In doing
so, these courts have reached a variety of different holdings, providing for
a somewhat confusing and disjointed legal landscape not only among the
federal circuit courts, but also in some instances within the circuits
themselves.
TITLE VII CLAIMS AND EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIPS IN MEDICAL
STAFF PRIVILEGES CASES
Federal courts differ significantly in their conclusions as to whether a
physician with medical staff privileges at a hospital is an employee of that
hospital under the provisions of Title VII. Despite these broad variances
in federal court decisions, the cases considering this issue can be grouped
into three categories.
Specifically, courts have found either no
employment relationship between a physician and a hospital, a direct
employer-employee relationship between a doctor and a hospital, or an
indirect employment relationship between a physician and a third party
other than a hospital. In finding that a physician has established an
employment relationship with an independent third party, courts have held
hospitals liable on the theory that termination of the physician's medical
staff privileges is equivalent to interference with the third party
employment relationship. Thus, several courts have allowed a physician
to maintain a federal employment discrimination claim under Title VII
because of the existence of an indirect employment nexus. An in-depth
analysis of the cases in each of these categories reveals inconsistencies not
only in the case holdings, but also in the various courts' reasoning and
application of law to the facts in each case.
' Mitchell v. Frank R. Howard Memorial Hosp., 853 F2d 762 (9th Cir. 1938), cert denied, 439
U.S. 1013 (1989); Diggs v. Harris Hosp.-Methodist. Inc., 847 FR2d 270 (5th Or), cert denied,488

U.S. 956 (1988); Pardazi v. Cullman Medical Ctr., 838 Fd 1155 (11th Cir 1988), John:on v
Greater Southeast Community Hosp. Corp., 903 F. Supp. 140 (D-D.C 1995), Cabaniz v Cco:a
ValleyMedical Cr., CV93-PT-2710-E, 1995 WL 241937 (N.D. Ala, Mar, 20, 1995), Mallare v. St
Luke's Hosp., 699 F. Supp. 1127 (ED. Pa. 19SS), qffd, 914 F2d 243 (3d Cir 1990), Mouzavi v.
BeebeHosp., 674 F. Supp. 145 (D. Del. 1987),aft'd, 853 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1938); Amro v. St Luke%
Hosp.,No. Civ. A. No. 84-1355, 1986 WL 766 (ED. Pa. Jan. 13, 1986); Beverle v Douglas, 591
F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Cases Finding a Direct Employer-Employee Relationship
At least two federal courts have concluded that a physician with staff
privileges may be a hospital employee for the purposes of adjudicating the
physician's Title VII employment discrimination claim against the
hospital.'M In Cabanissv. Coosa Valley Medical Cr., the court held that
a nurse anesthetist's ("CRNA") status as an employee within the meaning
of Title VII was a question of fact.55 While the Cabanisscourt ultimately
granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment, the court also noted
that the CRNA could be an employee of the hospital. 6
The Cabaniss decision is significant in a staff privileges analysis
because a CRNA's relationship with a hospital strongly resembles that of
a doctor with medical staff privileges. In fact, the CRNA. in Cabaniss,
although initially an employee of the defendant hospital, eventually
provided her services to the defendant hospital on a contractual basis, 7
The defendant hospital contended that the plaintif 2"
was not an
"employee" within the meaning of Title VII, and listed several facts in
support of its argument. The hospital noted that it did not pay the plaintiff
any wages, did not control the plaintiffs working hours or on- call schedule,
did not provide the plaintiff any benefits, annual leave, or vacation, and did
not pay Social Security taxes on behalf of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the
hospital presented evidence that neither it nor the plaintiff had intended to
enter into an employment relationship.
The plaintiff CRNA countered the hospital's argument by offering
evidence that she was required to have affiliate privileges with the hospital,
that she had to work under the direction and supervision of a physician,
and that all of the equipment and supplies used in the performance of her
job were provided by the hospital. The plaintiff also contended she was an
employee of the hospital for Title VII purposes because the hospital
retained the right to control the manner of her performance. In support of

5
Mitchell, 853 F.2d at 762, cert denied, 489 U.S. at 1013; Cabaniss, at 1995 WL 241937 (ND.
Ala. Mar. 20, 1995).
"S Cabaniss, 1995 WL 241937 at *8-.

16

Id. at *21.

" The plaintiff nurse anesthetist in Cabanissactually established her own partnership business
with several other health care providers and subsequently contracted xvith the hospital for her services,
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this argument, the plaintiff relied upon Pardaziv. CullmanMfedical Ctr.,"
a case adopting the Spirides 12-factor hybrid test. In considering this
argument together with the available evidence, the court applied the 12part hybrid test from Spirides."
Although the factors in support of the hospital's argument that the
CRNA was an independent contractor seemed to outweigh factors
supporting the nurse's contention that she was an employee, the court
concluded suprisingly that the plaintiff "may be [an] employee[] within the
meaning of the Title VII statute."6 In noting "[t]here may be at least a
question of fact as to whether [the hospital] retained the right to control
the manner and means of the performance of [the CRNA's] job ... ,,,, the
court appeared to rely upon the Spirides court's direction that the extent
of an employer's right to control the worker's performance is the most
important factor that a court must consider under the hybrid test. Thus,
the Cabanisscourt concluded the plaintiff could be an employee of the
hospital for Title VII purposes and "there was at least a question of fact as
to whether [the hospital] retained the right to control the manner and
means of the plaintiffs job performance.6 " In a footnote, however, the
court clearly noted that it did "not definitively decide this issue," and that
it did "not reach it as a basis for its final decision.""3
Interestingly, in concluding that a direct employer-employee
relationship existed between the CRNA and the hospital, the court
disregarded the plaintiffs contention that she was entitled to Title VII
protection because the statute did not require that a defendant be an
"employer" or the plaintiff an "employee" in order for discrimination that
affects a term or condition of the plaintiffs employment to exist.' This
type of argument has been advanced by physicians in a number of other
cases in which federal courts have found an indirect employment

5' Pardazi v. Cullman Medical Ctr., 838 F.2d 1155 (1 th Cir. 1988), r,-'d896 F2d 1313 (1 lit
Cir. 1990).
'9 Cabaniss,1995 WL 241937 at *8.
6" Id. at *21.
61 Id.
62 J
6

'

Id. at *30, n.20.
Cabaniss v. Coosa Valley Medical Ctr., No. CV 93-PT-2710-E, 1995 WL 241937, at *9

(N.D.AIa. Mar. 20, 1995).
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relationship, thereby allowing the physician to bring a Title VII claim
against a hospital that terminated the physician's staff privileges.6" In fact,
the Eleventh Circuit has held in favor of a physician who stated a claim for
relief under Title VII based on an allegation that a hospital's denial of the
physician's staff privileges interfered with his employment relationship with
a third party.' Although the Cabanisscourt acknowledged Pardaziin its
evaluation of the Spirides hybrid test, it failed to analyze the plaintiffs
indirect employment relationship argument, opting instead to conclude that
a direct employer-employment relationship "may" exist.
In a similar case involving a radiologist's Title VII action against a
hospital for the termination of its agreement with the radiologist, the Ninth
Circuit held that the radiologist provided sufficient evidence to prove an
employer-employee relationship for Title VII purposes.67 Like the court
in Cabaniss,the Ninth Circuit in Mitchell chose to distinguish its case from
existing the existing precedent of Gomez v. Alexian Bros. )Yosp., 6 8 in its
own circuit that had involved an employment discrimination claim in a staff
privileges case. In Gomez, the Ninth Circuit held that the language of Title
VII forbidding discrimination in employment encompasses situations in
which a defendant subject to Title VII interferes with an individual's
employment opportunities with another employer.69 Although the plaintiff
in Mitchell argued that the defendant hospital had interfered with his
employment relationship with the professional corporation of which he was
a sole shareholder, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument based upon the
belief that this was not the type of employment relationship Congress had
intended to protect under Title VII. 70

Instead, citing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lutcher v. Musician's
Union Local 47,71 the Mitchell court first noted that a "plaintiff need not
aver the existence of a protected employment relation ship with the
defendant, but rather could state a claim under Title VII by averring that
'5

See subpart "C" infra.

65 See Pardazi v. Cullman Medical Ctr., 838 F.2d 1155, 1156 (1 th Cir. 1988),
67 Mitchell v. Frank R. Howard Memorial Hosp., 853 F.2d 762,766-67 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.

denied,489 U.S. 1013 (1989).
's Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1983).
69 Id. at 1021.
70 Mitchell, 853 F.2d at 767.
7' Lutcher v. Musician's Union Local 47,633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980),
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a defendant's actions interfered 'with an individual's employment
opportunities with another employer."" The court then noted, however,

based on its decision in Lutcher, "there must be some connection with an
employment relationship for Title VII protections to apply."' Thus, the
Ninth Circuit concluded in Mitchell that the plaintiff had not alleged any
facts that would support a finding of an employment relationship between
plaintiff and his patients for purposes of Title VII, and therefore, failed to
state a claim for relief under Title VII based on the hospital's alleged
interference with his third party employment opportunities.'
Moreover, the Mitchell court also rejected the plaintiffs argument
that the defendant hospital interfered with his employment relationship with
a professional corporation." In doing so, the court further distinguished
its case from that in Gomez by stating that while Gomez involved a
corporation that employed a number of doctors who rendered medical
services as part of the corporation's group medical practice, "[i]n contrast,
Dr. Mitchell is both the76sole shareholder and sole employee of his
professional corporation.
The Mitchell court concluded ultimately that a direct employeremployee relationship existed between the plaintiff physician and the
defendant hospital. 77 The court based this holding on the fact that the
plaintiff was paid by the hospital rather than by his patients, as well as the
inference that the hospital enjoyed considerable control over the "means
and manner" of the plaintiffs performance. 7' Additionally, the court found
that because the plaintiff did not aver that his relationships with his patients
in any way diverged from the traditional physician/patient relationship, his
his patient relationships failed
allegations that the hospital interfered with
7
VII.
Title
under
relief
for
claim
a
state
to

72

Mitchell, 853 F.2d at 767.

73

Id.

74 Id.
75 Id.
76

Id.

Mitchellv. Frank R. Horad Memorial Hosp., 353 F.2d 762,767 (9th Cir. 1933), cerl denied,
489 U.S. 1013 (1989).
7S Id.
7

79

Id.
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It is interesting to note that both the Cabanissand Mitchell courts
emphasized that the defendant hospitals retained considerable control over
the plaintiffs' performance, but in Mitchell the hospital paid the radiologist,
while in Cabanissthe nurse anesthetist was paid by the partnership she had
joined to provide anesthesia services to the hospital on a contractual basis.
Furthermore, while the Cabanisscourt relied directly upon the hybrid test
established in Spirides,the Mitchell court concluded that it should employ
a fact-specific inquiry that "depends upon the economic realities of the
situation," and that "a number of factors should be considered when
determining whether an employment relationship existed, the primary one
being the extent to which the 'employer' has a right to control the means
and manner of the worker's performance."8 In reaching this conclusion,
the Ninth Circuit relied upon its previous decision in Lutcher.1 A close
examination of Lutcher reveals, however, that the Ninth Circuit in that case
cited to Spirides where it adopted its test for determining whether an
employment relationship exists between two parties.8 2 Therefore, it
appears that while the Mitchell court never expressly stated that it was
employing the Spirides 12-factor hybrid test in its analysis, the court did
actually apply the hybrid test to Dr. Mitchell's claim.
While these cases may seem relatively consistent in that they both find
a direct employer-employee relationship as part of their holdings, both the
factual underpinnings of the cases as well as the legal analysis employed by
the courts to determine whether there is an employee-employer relationship
in their respective cases, are somewhat inconsistent. Moreover, the cases
themselves seem inconsistent with regard to their own precedent within the
Eleventh and Ninth Circuits. While the Mitchell court distinguished its
facts and its holding from that in Gomez, the court in Cabaniss,despite the
plaintiffs pleas, failed to consider the argument that a hospital can interfere
with a physician's or CRNA's third party employment relationships as set
forth in Pardazi. This is exactly the type of inconsistency that seems to
typify the majority of staff privileges cases involving Title V1I employment
discrimination claims.
IId. at 766.
"

Id.

'z

Lutcher v. Musician's Union Local 47,633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1980).
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Cases Finding No Employer-Employee Relationship
A number of federal courts have held that no direct or indirect employment
relationship exists between a hospital and staff physician.' In what has
become a leading case on this issue, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York held that there was no employment
relationship between a hospital, a college, and a voluntary medical staff. 4
The plaintiff in Beverley v. Douglas brought a civil rights action to
challenge the denial of her application for voluntary attending privileges
at the hospital. In reaching its decision, the court found the hospital"5 had
both a fill-time attending staff and a voluntary attending staff, and that the
full-time staff physicians were employees of the hospital and the college,
but the voluntary staff doctors were not employees."
The court based its conclusion on its application of the conclusion,
12-factor Spirideshybrid test to the voluntary staffs relationship with the
teaching hospital and held that "[c]onsideration of each of the relevant
factors leaves no room to doubt that the relationship between the Hospital
and the voluntary staff is not one of employment.""7 As part of its analysis
of the case under the Spirides test, the court noted that:
There is a sharp delineation in the duties, functions, and relationship
to the Hospital and the College of the two groups . .. full-time
physicians have Hospital- based practices. Physicians with voluntary

Diggs v. Harris Hosp.-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that phyziein
lacked capacity to bring suit under Title VII because no cmploymcnt relationship e-asted with the

hospital), cert denied,488 U.S. 956 (1988); Johnson v. Greater Southeast Community Ho,

Corp,,

903 F. Supp. 140 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding no Title VII claim %Nherephy ;icians aceee.s to rotential
patient-employers is not controlled by the hospital); Samuels v. Rayford, No, Civ A, No 910365(JHG), 1995 WL 376939 (D.D.C. April 10, 1995); Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 996
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1990), cerL denied,498 US. 869 (1990), Beverley v,
Douglas, 591 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also St. Lukes Health Sy,,. v. State, 884 P2d 259
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the hybrid test applies to determining vhether an emp!oyment
relationship exists for purposes of the Arizona Civil Rights Act and that physician vas not a hospital
employee based on his staff privileges).
' Beverley, 591 F. Supp. at 1327.
85 Id. at 1323 (stating that the hospital was a teaching hospital affiliated vath the Comell
University Medical College).
85 Id. at 1327.
8 Id.
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privileges have practices outside the Hospital and are selfemployed or are professional corporations. Full-time attending staff
members are paid a salary by the Hospital, from which income and
social security taxes are withheld, whilevoluntary stafr members
receive no salary. The licensing fees and professional clues of the
full-time attending physicians are paid by the hospital, which also
provides them with retirement benefits, health and life insurance, and
coverage under the Hospital's malpractice insurance policy; voluntary
attending staff members receive no such benefits. The Hospital
provides office space and support staff for full-time attending staff; the
voluntary staff members have no offices at the Hospital. The Hospital
exercises some control over the work of its full-time attending
physicians -it can direct staff members to work at affiliated hospitals,
for example, and can hold full-time attending physicians accountable
for their time. No such control is exercised over voluntary attending
doctors. 88
Attempting to counterbalance these numerous factors, the plaintiff
argued that voluntary physicians attended clinics and taught students at the
request of the hospital's department chairmen. The court responded by
stating that "[t]hose facts shed no light on whether the voluntary staff
physicians are employees of the Hospital, because they would apply equally
to an independent contractor, or even to a physician who volunteered his
or her services to the Hospital without requiring the quid pro quo of
admitting privileges." 9
The plaintiff next argued that even if there was no employment
relationship between the voluntary staff and the hospital, her application
for voluntary admitting privileges would, nevertheless, come under Title
VII coverage because the Hospital's denial of her application "interfered
with plaintiffs employment opportunities" and caused her to lose income."°
In support of her argument, the plaintiff cited several cases that held a
physician may come under Title VII protection if a defendant hospital
significantly affected or controlled the plaintiffs access to other

8I Id. (emphasis added).

s Beverley v. Douglas, 591 F.Supp. 1321, 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

IId.

19961

STIRRJNG MUDDLED WATERS

employment opportunities in a discriminatory manner?' The court,
however, rejected the plaintiff s indirect employment argument noting that
"[e]ven assuming that plaintiff has alleged that the Hospital's denial of her
application for voluntary attending privileges interfered with her
relationship to her patients, her relationship to her patients is not one of
employment."'92 The Beverly court also pointed out that the plaintiff in
Beverley did not state she had lost patients or was prevented from taking
patients because she had no admitting privileges at the hospital, unlike
other cases in which a plaintiff is prevented from entering into employment
relationships because the hospital blocks physical access to a potential
employer.93 The court further noted that the plaintiff admitted that there
was no question the relationship between a physician and his or her patient
is that of an independent contractor, and that "[i]n order to invoke Title
VII, plaintiff must allege and prove some link between the defendant's
actions and an employment relationship."9 Because the court found no
such connection in Beverley, it granted summary judgment to the
hospital.95
It is important to note that while other courts within the same circuit
have applied different tests and reached rather inconsistent holdings in Title
VII staff privileges cases, the Southern District of New York has not.
Several years after the Beverley decision, a case arose in that district in
which a doctor sued the Cornell University Medical College alleging civil
rights violations for failure to continue his appointment as a visiting
lecturer or to assign him teaching duties." Relying upon the Spirides
hybrid test and the Beverley decision, the court in Tadros v. Coleman
concluded that a plaintiff must render a putative employer some kind of
service from which the employer willingly derives a benefit, and that a

9 See Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1983); Sib!ey Memornial Hp v,

Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp, 547 F. Supp 484 (ED Pa
1982).
92 Beverley, 591 F. Supp. at 1328.
9' Id. at 1328, n. 24.
' Id. at 1328 (footnote omitted).
95

Id.

" Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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volunteer is not an employee and cannot maintain an action under Title
VII.9 Thus, the court in Tadros dismissed the plaintiffs complaint. 8
At least two other jurisdictions have followed the Beverley court's
holding.' In Diggs v. HarrisHosp.-Methodist,Inc,the Fifi h Circuit held
that a employer-employee relationship did not exist between a physician
and a hospital which terminated the physician's staff privileges.1"' The
plaintiff in Diggs advanced two theories of Title VII coverage, alleging
both that she was an employee of the hospital and that Title VII
encompasses interference by an employer with a person's access to the
employment market. In rejecting the plaintiffs argument that she was an
employee of the hospital the court applied the Spirides hybrid test and
found that "[a]s a matter of economic reality, Diggs, as an obstetriciangynecologist, is dependent upon having hospital staff privileges in order to
pursue her medical practice.""1 1 The court, however, focused on the
control factor and concluded that while the hospital suppfied the tools,
staff and equipment utilized by the plaintiff and imposed standards upon
physicians with staff privileges, it did not direct the manner or means by
which the plaintiff rendered medical care. 2 Furthermore, the court noted
that the hospital did not pay the plaintiff a salary, nor (lid it pay the
plaintiffs licensing fees, professional dues, insurance, taxes, or retirement
benefits."3
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs contention that even if she
did not have an employment relationship with the hospital, the alleged
discrimination came under Title VII coverage because the hospital's actions
interfered with her employment opportunities.' In rejecting this theory
the Fifth Circuit followed the Beverley court's reasoning and noted that:

97Id.

at 1001-03.

98 Id. at 1012.
'"

See Diggs v. Harris Hosp.-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1988), cert, denied,488

U.S. 956 (1988); Samuels v. Rayford, No. Civ. A. No. 91-0365(JHG), 1995 WL 376939 (D.D.C.
April 10, 1995).
'0oId. at 274.
101 Id. at 273.
102

Id.

Id.
"0 Diggs v. Harris Hosp-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270,273-274 (5th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 488
U.S. 956 (1988) (emphasis added).
103
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The employment opportunities to which [the plaintifilpoints were her
potential treatment arrangements with private patients .... A Title VII
claim must involve discriminatory conduct that affects an employment
relationship of the complainant, as determined by application of the
economic realities/common law control test.
Under the above test, [the plaintiff's] relationship with her
patients is decidedly not one of employment. Her patients did not
control the manner and means of her professional treatment. A
physician's work involves considerable skill. Further, patients do not
furnish the equipment, instruments, supplies, and support staff
used in a physician's rendition of medical care. Paymaent is for
services rendered, not on-going compensation .... 1"

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has also
followed the reasoning/holdings of Beverley and Diggs."c Unlike the
consistent and homogeneous decisions from the Fifth Circuit and the
Southern District of New York, however, the deicisons in Samuels
v.Rayford and Johnson v. Greater Southeast Community Hospital
Corporationare inconsistent with their circuit's case law. While the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit previously
held that a private duty nurse could maintain a Title VII employment
discrimination action against a hospital even though the parties did not
stand in a direct employment relationship," 7 both the Johnson and
Samuels courts reached contrary holdings.
In Johnson, the district court considered an African-American
physician's argument that Title VII applies to conduct that interferes with
employment relationship such as the physician-patient relationship, and that
medical staff privileges at the defendant hospital provided clear
employment opportunities for practicing physicians." In evaluating this
argument under the 12-factor, hybrid test from Spirides, the court
provided a factor-by-factor analysis of the plaintiffs argument and held that

"0

l

Id.(emphasis added).

See Johnson v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp. Corp., 903 F. Supp, 140 (DD)C, 1995);

Samuels v. Rayford, No. Civ. A. 91-0365(JHG), 1995 WL 376939 (D.D.C. April 10, 1995).
"0
Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338,134142 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
ICs Johnson, 903 F. Supp. at 154-55.
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the criteria indicated the existence of a classic independent contractor
relationship, and concluded that "[s]ince plaintiffs status is that of an
independent contractor and not an employee, he may not invoke Title VII
as a basis for his claim against the Hospital.'0 9
In order to distinguish the circuit decision in Sibley MemorialHosp.
v. Wilson, the Johnson court applied the twelfth and most important
Spirides factor, the ability of the alleged employer to control the means and
manner of the plaintiffs performance. In doing so, the court noted that:
In Sibley, the hospital prevented plaintiff from entering into
employment relationships with patients by blocking plaintiffs physical
access to his potential employers. The hospital therefore had complete
control over plaintiffs ability to secure potential employment. This is
not true for Dr. Johnson. Unlike the nurse in Sibley, Dr. Johnson's
access to potential patient-employers is not controlled by the Hospital
...[that] may control the premises... but.., has no absolutely no
control over Dr. Johnson's ability to secure patients and to enter into
employment relationships with the patients." 0°
Consequently, based on its application of the Spirides test, and in particular
the court's finding that the hospital in no way controlled the plaintiff
physicians employment opportunities with his patients, the Johnson court
held that there was no employer-employee relationship implicated in the
physician's medical practice at the hospital."'
In Samuels, the same district court considered an issue similar to that
in Johnsonwhen an African-American female physician brought an action

'0'Id. at 155-56. In applying the first eleven factors of the Spiridestest, the court determined that:
(1) a physician's work is normally conducted without supervision by the patient; 12) the practice of
medicine is a highly skilled and specialized profession; (3) neither the equipment not the place of work
is provided by the patient; (4) a physician's work with respect to individual patients is usually brief
and/or episodic; (5) the method of payment varies with patient and the particular serviees rendered;(6)
the work relationship can be terminated at will by either the patient or the physician; (7) no annual
leave is provided by the patient, (8) the services provided by the physician are typically not an integral
part ofthe work the patient (9) the patient provides no retirement benefits for the physician; (10) the
patient pays no social security taxes; and (11) patients generally do not intend to become a physician's
employer.
Io
Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
IId.
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under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act ("DCHRA") after a
hospital terminated her staff privileges. The plaintiff conceded in her
complaint that she was not an employee of the hospital, but argued that the
defendants interfered with her ability to work for the hospital's patients.11
As part of its analysis of the plaintiffs claim, the court stated that
"[w]ithout question, Sibley holds that Title VII (and, therefore, the
DCHRA) does not require an employer-employee relationship between
plaintiff and defendant.""' But the Samuels court also noted that the
Sibley court did not continue its analysis to answer the question posed in
the Samuels case of whether a plaintiff must stand in an employeremployee relationship with a third party to impose Title VII liability on a
defendant."' While several other courts analyzed this issue in light of
Sibley, and held there is no need for an employer-employee relationship in
order to impose Title VII liability," 5 the Samuels court refused to adopt
such a broad reading. The court concluded that "[i]n the absence of
legislative guidance or precedent in this jurisdiction . . . the..

DCHRA requires [that] an employer-employee relationship exists either
between plaintiff and defendant or between the plaintiff and a thirdparty.""' 6 Additionally, relying in part on the Beverley and Diggs
decisions, the Samuels court held there was no employer-employee
relationship between a physician who is an independent contractor and her
patients." 7

While consistent with each other, the Johnson and Samuels decisions
are inconsistent with the holding in Sibley for two reasons. First, although
the Johnson court distinguished its case from Sibley using the "control"
factor from Spirides,the court's enumeration of the other eleven factors
from Spirides would change the holding of Sibley if applied to a private

11

1995).

Samuels v. Rayford, No. Civ. A. 91-0365 (JHG), 1995 WL 376939, at *5 (D DC. April 10,

113

Id.

114

Id.

.. See Christopher v. Stouder Memorial Hosp., 936 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1991), ccrt denied, 502
U.S. 1013 (1991); Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 78S F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1986); LeMaslters v, Christ
Hosp., 777 F. Supp. 1378 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 424 (ED.
Pa. 1982).
116 Samuels, 1995 WL 376939, at *6 (emphasis added).
117

Id. at*7.
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duty nurse-patient relationship. In other words, the analysis applied by the
Johnson court to find the relationship between a physician and patient is
that of an independent contractor, would likely reach the same result if it

was applied to the private duty nurse in Sibley."' This outcome seems
inconsistent with Sibley's holding because the appellate court interpreted

Title VII as extending beyond the bounds of an ordinary employment
relationship and also applicable to individuals who do not stand in a direct
employment relationship with an employer." 9
The Sibley case involved a male private duty nurse who filed a Title

VII sex discrimination claim against a hospital which refused to allow him
to care for female patients. Although the plaintiff had no direct
employment relationship with the hospital, the court held that Title VII had
a broader scope than the confines of the ordinary employment
relationship.12 In doing so, the court emphasized that Title VII uses the
word "individuals," and therefore refrained from restricting the Act to only
direct employer-employee relationships.'

Second, the Sibley court's finding of an employment relationship, as
well as similar holdings by courts in at least four other circuits based on
their broad reading of Sibley,"2 are inconsistent with the Johnson and
Samuels decisions. It is odd that courts in other circuits would follow
what amounts to some rather tenuous, but persuasive, authority from the

"" Johnson v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp. Corp., 903 F. Supp. 140 (D.D.C. 1995). An
application ofthe eleven factors to the relationship between a private duty nurse and a patient reveals
the following: (1) the nurse's duty is normally conducted without the patient's supervision, but more
likely that of a physician; (2) nursing is a highly skilled and specialized professicn; (3) neither the
equipment nor the place ofwork is provided by the patient if the nurse is performing his or her services
at a hospital; (4) the nurse's work with respect to the patient is normally brief (i.e the length of the
patients hospital stay); (5) the patient typically does not pay the nurse's salary, (6) the work relationship
can theoretically be terminated by either party, (7) no annual leave is provided by the patient; (8) the
services provided by the nurse are typically not part of the patient's business or work; (9) the patient
provides no retirement benefits for the physician; (10) the patient pays no social security taxew; and
(11) patients generally do not intend to become a nurse's employer.
119 Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
120

Id.

121

Id.

See Christopher v. Stouder Memorial Hosp., 936 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1988), cer, denied, 502
U.S. 1013 (1991); Pardazi v. Cullman Medical Ctr., 838 F.2d 1155 (1lth Cir. 1988); Doe v. St.
Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1986); Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484 (E.D.
Pa. 1982).
"
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D.C. Circuit, while federal district courts within the circuit itself have not
followed seemingly mandatory authority in their own cases This
juxtaposition of case authority, however, is not unusual in staff privileges
cases involving Title VII employment discrimination claims. It appears as
though courts will read and apply the existing case law either broadly or
narrowly in order to reach the outcome the courts expect or desire in the
particular staff privileges case. This is even more apparent upon analysis
of other staff privileges cases in which courts have concluded that a
physician may bring a Title VII claim based on the existence of some
indirect or third party employment relationship.
Cases Finding an Indirect or Third Party Employment Relationship
As noted above, the seminal case with regard to third party employment
relationships in Title VII staffprivileges cases seems to be Sibley Memorial
Hosp. v. Wilson." 3 Perhaps the biggest irony besides the refusal of the
district courts in the D.C. Circuit to follow Sibley, is that Sibley involved
a nurse rather than a staff physician, yet other courts have chosen to apply
this factually distinctive case to cases involving termination of a physician's
staff privileges.
At least four other circuits have adopted Sibleys broad reading of
Title VII in considering whether a staff physician may maintain a Title VII
employment discrimination action against a hospital that terminates a
physician's privileges.124 In Pao i.Holy Redeemer Hosp,, a Chinese
doctor brought suit under Title VII on the theory he was denied staff
privileges on the basis on his ethnic background. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded that the
case fell "quite clearly within the line of cases beginning with Sibley. .""
Rather than applying the Spirideshybrid test, however, the court looked
only at the economic control the hospital had over the physician's
practice.'26 Concluding the hospital had influence over the physician's
'2
114

Sibley 488 F.2d at 133S.
See Christopher,at 936 F.2d at S70, cert. denied, 502 U S. at 1013;Pardaz.833 F2d at

1155; Doe., 788 F.2d at 411; Pao, 547 F. Supp. at 434.
" Pao,547 F. Supp. at 494.
126 Id.
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ability to find prospective patients, the court determined the hospital
maintained significant control over Dr. Pao's access to other employment
opportunities.127 Therefore, the court held an employment relationship
existed between the physician and the hospital."'
After Pao, two other cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held that an employment relationship can exist between a medical resident
and a hospital based on staff privileges. 29 Amro v. St. Luke's Hosp
involved a Title VII claim by a physician who was a surgical resident at the
defendant hospital when the hospital denied his application for staff
privileges. In Amro, the court applied the Spirides hybrid test to determine
whether an employment relationship existed. 3 ° Through its analysis of the
12 factors, the court concluded "the hospital does not pay the doctors
who have staff privileges any salary, nor provide them with any retirement
benefits, vacation plans or other forms of remuneration ...[and] does not
supervise their work or make any demands of the doctors.""' Thus, the
court stated these factors suggested the defendant hospital was not an
employer as defined by Title VII.32 The court, however, did not end its
analysis at this point. Citing the earlier Pao decision and the Pao court's
use of the broader "economic realities" test, the court in Amrq stated that:
[The] opinion still can be relied upon to show that a hospital maintains
economic control over a doctor. Moreover, the present case involves a
surgeon who would be unable to practice his specialty without the use
of the hospital's facilities rather than an ophthalmologist as in Pao.
Also, the fact that the defendant hospital can influence other hospitals
across the country on their decision to hire Dr. Amro demonstrates the
economic control that St. Luke's has over the plaintiff. This control
aspect is the most important fact in the hybrid test and could

127
128

Id.
Id.

" See Mallare v. St. Luke's Hosp., 699 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Amro v. St. Luke's Hosp.,
No. Civ. A. No. 84-1355, 1986 WL 766 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 1986).
'" Anro, 1986 WL at *3 (citing EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32,37 (3d Cir. 1983) which
adopts the Spirides hybrid test).
131 Id.
132 Id.
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conceivably outweigh the other factors to characterize the hospital
as an employer for Title VII purposes. 33
Relying on the Third Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Zippo Mfg.Co,
however, the court concluded that "even though the defendant hospital
may exercise economic control over the plaintiffs future ability to earn
income, this is not sufficient to counterbalance all of the factors which tend
to classify the doctor as an independent contractor."' 34
But despite this conclusion, the Amro court still managed to find an
employment relationship between the resident physician and the defendant
hospital. Noting that Title VII protects individuals in the "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment," the court looked to the prior
contractual relationship the plaintiff had established with the hospital as a
surgical resident.' 35 Relying upon the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Hinshon v. King &Spalding,36 the Amro court concluded that
the hospital's consideration of the plaintiff for staff privileges was a fringe
benefit of employment. 13 7 Therefore, the court held that even though the
right to have staff privileges was not a contractual provision in the
plaintiffs contract, "it would still be actionable under Title33VII as a benefit
which cannot be doled out in a discriminatory manner.'
In Mallare v. St. Luke's Hosp., the district court held it could not
conclude "as a matter of law, that the defendant [hospital] is not the
prospective 'employer' of the plaintiff under the circumstances here
present.139 In reaching this decision, the court determined that the "proper
standard to apply to the determination of employment status for Title VII
purposes in this Circuit is the hybrid standard described in Zippo"' in
which the Court takes, while taking into account the economic realities of
the situation presented, focuses on the employer's right to control the

3

Id. (emphasis added).
*3.

134 Id. at
135

Laura D. Estrin,HospitalandAidsDiscrimihation:.4pplicabiliyofFederalDisrimmnation

Laws to HCWS andStaffPhysicians,6 J.Co,rEmP. HEALTH L. & POL"L 193 (Spnng 1990).
3
I-inston v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (19S4).
13' Amo v. St.Luke's Hosp., No. Civ. A. 84-1355,1986 WL 766, at *4 (E D Pa, Jan 13, 19S6)
138
'

Id.

Mallare v. St. Luke's Hosp., 699 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 CED,Pa. 198S)

140 EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1983).

DePA UL JOURNAL OFHEALTH CARE LAW

(Vol. 1:19

employee.'141 Based upon analysis of all 12 factors from the SpiridesZippo hybrid test, the court determined that:
[A] simple counting of the eleven enumerated factors in the context of
a doctor/hospital relationship would seem to weigh somewhat more
heavily in favor of no employment relationship. We must keep in mind
that the factors themselves are mere aids in determining the ultimate
question of control of the means and manner of the "employee's" job
performance and that the Court is also required to consider the
economic realities of the situation. When those general principles are
also weighed in the balance, the question of the existence of an
employment relationship for Title VII purposes becomes much closer.
While control over the manner of job performance in the sense of
supervision of discrete tasks is missing, ultimate control can be
exercised by a hospital in the sense that privilege:; can be
withdrawn if a doctor's performance does not comport with
hospital standards. Certainly, the withholding or withdrawal of
staff privileges allows a hospital to control the means of a doctor's
job performance to the extent that the work must be perrormed in
a hospital setting, using hospital equipment and support staff. 4 '
Based on this reasoning, the court held that material issues of fact existed
as to whether the hospital was the employer of the physician for purposes
of Title VII, and thus, denied the hospital's motion for summary
1 43
judgment.
In arguendo, it is important to note the inconsistencies that exist
between the holdings of Amro and Mallare, two cases that involved
practically the same issue, as well as analogous factual situations. In both
cases, the defendant was the same hospital (St. Luke's). The plaintiffs
were both medical residents at St. Luke's who brought national origin
discrimination claims under Title VII after their applications for staff
41 Mallare,699 F. Supp. at 1129.
142 Id. at 1130 (emphasis added).
141 Id. at 1133. See also Mousavi v. Beebe Hosp., 674 F. Supp. 145 (D. Dul. 1987), qfld, 853
F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying Spirides/Zippo hybrid test and holding that -?hysician's potential
relationship with hospital as a neurologist with staff privileges was a relationship bitween an employer
and employee for purposes ofTitle VII, and, thus, the physician had standing to bring suit under Title

VII, even though the potential relationship would not be a formal employment relationship).
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privileges at St. Luke's were denied by the hospital. Both cases were
decided by courts in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Furthermore,
both courts employed the same legal analysis, using the Spirides-Zippo

hybrid test, to determine if an employment relationship existed between the
hospital and the plaintiffs, and both courts recognized the control factor as
the pivotal issue under the hybrid test. Yet despite the multitude of legal
and factual similarities, the courts reached seemingly opposite conclusions
concerning the defendant hospital's ability to control the plaintiffs'
Such inconsistencies perhaps serve to
employment opportunities."
parties can expect to encounter while
that
confusion
the
demonstrate
case involving a Title VII employment
litigating a staff privileges
145
claim.
discrimination
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania is not the only jurisdiction that
has struggled with the issue of an indirect or third party employment

relationship in a medical staff privileges case. The Seventh Circuit, as well
as federal district courts in that jurisdiction, have considered the issue"5
and, while they have reached consistent conclusions, they have not
employed consistent legal reasoning to reach their conclusions.
Furthermore, what otherwise might be considered to be the Circuit's

leading staff privileges case involving an employment discrimination
" TheAmro court concluded that "[e]ven though the defendant hospital may exercise economic
control over the plaintiffs future income, this is not sufficient to counterbalance all the other factors
v.Nch tend to classify the doctor as an independent contractor." Amro v. St. Luke's Hop,,No. Civ,
A 84-1355,1986 WL766 at *3.In denying the defendant hospital's motion for summary judgment
and concluding that it could not say as a matter of law that the defendant hospital was not the
"prospective employer" of the plaintiff, theMallarecourt concluded that:

[a] doctor viho practices surgery or expects to deliver babies depends upon acce-s to
a hospital for his patients and is unlikely to attract many patients without such
access. Where, as here, there is only one hospital in the area in which the
doctor expects to practice, denial of staff privileges there severely limits, if it
does not completely foreclose, the opportunity to develop a full practice....
Mallare,699 F. Supp. at 1131 (emphasis added).
Mallare, 699 F. Supp. at 1131, n.1 (noting that the Third Circuit has never spcifically
addressed the issue of whether Title VII applies to doctors who have been denied staff privileges),
See Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 19S6), Tabora v. Gottlieb Memorial
Hosp., 882 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Hl1.1995); Alexander v. Rush North Shore Medical Ctr,, 851 F. Supp
330 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Ikpoh v. Central DuPage Hosp., No. 90 C 7146, 1993 WIL 524817 (N D, lL
1991)
Dec. 15, 1993); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 765 F. Supp, 461 (ND. I1,
145

152
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claim,147 has been called into question and seems to provide only limited
guidance in staff privileges cases involving Title VII employment
discrimination claims.
In Doe v. St. Joseph'sHosp., the Seventh Circuit held a physician who
was not an employee of a hospital that terminated the physician's staff
privileges could maintain a claim under Title VII. 148 The plaintiff in Doe
sued the hospital and its board of directors, administrators, and the medical
staff executive committee after the hospital terminated her staff privileges.
She alleged the defendants had terminated her staff privileges because she
was Korean. While the district court dismissed the claim sua sponte, the
Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded in part, holding the plaintiff should
have been allowed to show the defendants discriminatorily interfered with
her employment opportunities with prospective patients who were her
'
"ultimate employers."149
As part of her argument, the plaintiff relied upon
the Sibley decision, arguing that Title VII does not require an employment
relationship between a plaintiff and a defendant as a prerequisite to a Title
VII claim. The court concluded that the plaintiffs reliance on Sibley was
appropriate, especially in the pleading stage of litigation.' In adopting the
plaintiffs argument, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the pivotal issue in
the case, as well as in the Sibley decision, was the hospital's influence and
control over access to the supply of patients who might form employment
relationships with the plaintiff."1 Furthermore, in reaching its holding, the
majority rejected both the dissent's reliance on the Beverley decision, and
the dissent's argument that even under Sibley the plaintiff could not invoke
Title VII because she does not have employment relationship with her
patients.152 The Seventh Circuit, however, was careful to note that while
"it is far from certain that the physician-patient relationship would not be
protected under a Sibley analysis, . . . [t]here is substantial uncertainty

See Doe, 788 F.2d at 411.
Id. at 425.
141 Id. at 425-26.
"O Id. at 422.
. Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411,423-424 (7th Cir. 1986).
112 Id. at 424.
147

148
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type of employment relationship that is protected by such an
about the 53
analysis."'
After the Doe decision, several district courts adjudicated staff
privileges cases involving Title VII claims. Significantly, while each of
these cases was decided in the Northern District of Illinois, there are
glaring inconsistencies among the decisions. Although it appears that in
Doe the Seventh Circuit considered both the economic realities of the
situation as well as the control aspect of the hospital's relationship with the
plaintif the court never expressly stated or held which test should be used
in such cases. Subsequent cases in the Northern District of Illinois have
struggled with this question. In Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., the
district court noted conflicting Seventh Circuit decisions concerning which
test to apply. The court considered both the Spirides hybrid test and the
"economic realities" test, and concluded that "in deciding whether an
employment relationship is present" it would follow the latter test as set
forth in EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd."4 (authority subsequent to and
factually distinctive from Doe). 5 The court next noted that "[i]dentifring
the proper standard to apply is only half the battle, actually applying it
presents altogether new problems."' 5'6 Because the plaintiff did not
maintain an outside practice or have outside patients whom she could
admit to the defendant hospital, the I aIkhariacourt did not preclude the
possibility of an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the
hospital.' 57 Additionally, the court held the plaintiff adequately alleged the
existence of an employment relationship between herself and her patients
or prospective patients. 5'
Shortly after the Vakharia decision seemed to established the
"economic realities" as the proper standard in staff privileges cases
involving a Title VII employment discrimination claim, another Northern
District of Illinois decision noted that "there is some confusion as to
whether the hybrid test or the economic realities test is the proper Seventh
153 Id. at 425.
4

EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir, 19S4).
Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 765 F. Supp. 461,466.46S (ND. Il. 1991)

155
156

Id. at 468.

157

Id.

15s Id.
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Circuit standard."' 5 9 Because of this perceived confusion, the court in
Ikpoh v. Central DuPage Hospital decided to analyze the plaintiffs
argument that an employment relationship existed between him and the
defendant hospital under both the hybrid and the "economic realities"
standards.16
In applying the 12 factor hybrid test from Spirides,the Ikpoh court
determined that the only factor in favor of the plaintiffs argument was that
the hospital provided equipment and the plaintiffs place of work.61 Thus,
the court held the evidence failed to establish an employment relationship
under the hybrid test." The court, however, then analyzed the case under
the "economic realities" test and held the plaintiff had presented sufficient
evidence to establish that an employment relationship existed for purposes
of Title VII. 163 The court based this decision on the fact that by denying
the plaintiff staff privileges, the hospital prevented the plaintiff from having
access to an entire group of potential patients. " Although the court went
on to hold the plaintiff had failed to establish that race or national origin
was a determining factor in the denial of his staff privileges application, and
entered judgment for the defendant, the court established a very confusing
and inconsistent standard by analyzing the plaintiffs claim under both the
hybrid and the "economic realities" standards. It seems as though the
Ikpoh court continued to analyze the case under different standards until
it reached the result it wanted; i.e., the existence of an employment
relationship between the parties. This type of decision-making by a court
creates confusion both for litigants, and for courts considering similar
issues in fiture cases at a time when both need a more definitive standard
on which to rely in these analytically difficult and extremely fact sensitive
cases.

"" See Ikpoh v. Central DuPage Hosp., No. 90 C 7146, 1993 WL 524817, at "17 (N.D. Il. Dec.
15, 1993). It is interesting to note here that the court cites to the Vakharia and not to the Doe
decision. Vakharia clearly adopted the "economic realities" standard.
160 Id.
"' Id. at *IS.
162 Id.
163 Id. at *18-19.
'

1993).

Ikpoh v. Central DuPage Hosp., No. 90 C 7146, 1993 WL 524817, at * 19 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15,
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Two other staff privileges cases from the Northern District of Illinois
reinforce this point. 6" While both of these cases held that a physician is
protected under Title VII where a hospital controlled a physician's
employment opportunities with patients, the courts are inconsistent in their
analysis. Taborav. Gottlieb MemorialHospitalapplied Doe and Sibley,
emphasizing the issue of control over access to employment relationships
with patients. 6 ' While the defendants in Tabora noted that Doe was
decided on a motion to dismiss whereas the motion in Taboraarose after
discovery on a motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that
"[u]nless the Seventh Circuit were to overrule Doe... it is clear that it
controls."'6 7 This conclusion seems to directly contradict the Vakharia
decision where the district court followed the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Dowd& Dowdrather then in Doe. The Alexander v. Rush North Shore
Medical Ctr. court on the other hand, applied both Vakhariaand Doe, but
also noted the Seventh Circuit in dicta has cast doubt as to the validity of
Doe.' Thus, it appears that not only is there some confusion within the
Seventh Circuit as to what standard should be applied to determine
whether an employment relationship exists between a hospital and
physician with staff privileges, but also that the Circuit's leading case rests
on an uncertain legal foundation.
While the Sixth Circuit seems to be more consistent than the Seventh
Circuit in its choice of what standard to use in similar cases, the Sixth
Circuit has not yet directly considered the issue of whether a doctor with
staff privileges at a hospital enjoys an employment relationship with that
hospital. Two federal district courts within the Sixth Circuit, however,
have held that Title VII applies to a hospital's termination of a physician's
staff privileges. 69 Both of these courts employed the "economic realities"
standard. 7 '

" See Tabora v. Gottlieb Memorial Hosp., 882 F. Supp. 117 (ND 111.1995); Alexander v. Ru'h
North Shore Medical Ctr., 851 F. Supp. 330 (ND. Ill. 1994),
'"
Tabora, 882F.Supp.at 118.
167 Id.
113 Alexander, 851 F. Supp.
at 332.
"' See LeMasters v. Christ Hosp., 777 F. Supp. 1378 (SD. Ohio 1991); Ro: v. William
Beaumont Hosp., 678 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 19SS).
" LeMasters, 777 F. Supp. at 13S0-S1; Ross, 67S F. Supp. at 675 (citing Armbru-ter v, Quinn,
711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983).
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In the leading Sixth Circuit staff privileges case involving a Title VII
employment discrimination claim, the plaintiff was a nurse, not a
physician."' The plaintiff in Christopherv. Stouder MemorialHosp. filed
a Title VII action against a hospital challenging its refusal to grant the
nurse limited privileges to work as a private duty scrub nurse for physicians
at the hospital. Relying upon the Sibley and Doe decisions, and employing
the "economic realities" standard, the Sixth Circuit held the nurse was
entitled to maintain a retaliation action under Title VII where the
hospital
172
opportunities.
employment
nurse's
had the ability to affect the
While the Sixth Circuit's decision is internally consistent and does not
conflict with either LeMasters v. Christ Hosp. or Ross v. William
Beaumont Hospital, it involves a nurse plaintiff rather than a physician
plaintiff. This raises questions with regard to how much reliance a Sixth
Circuit court considering a physician's complaint in a staff privileges case
should place on the Christopher decision. Obviously, there are factual
differences between a physician staff privileges case and a nurse's
employment discrimination claim based on a retaliation theory. Nurses
such as the plaintiff in Christopher,however, often have an independent
contractor type of relationship with a hospital, much like that of a physician
with staff privileges. The LeMasters court relied upon the Christopher
decision with little problem and without producing any major
inconsistency. Thus, it appears that if courts within a particular circuit
employ the same standard to determine whether an employment
relationship exists in a staff privileges case, and carefully apply established
precedent to the facts of a case, reasonable and consistent case decisions
could necessarily follow.
Finally, an Eleventh Circuit decision illustrates another way in which
courts may find an employment relationship in a staff privileges case for
purposes of determining whether a physician has standing to maintain a
claim under Title VII. 73 In Pardaziv. CullmanMedical Cir., a physician
brought a Title VII action against a hospital alleging national origin
discrimination after the hospital denied the physician's application for staff
171

See Christopher v. Stouder Memorial Hosp., 936 F.2d 870 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S,

1013 (1991).
'72 Id. at 873-875.
" See Pardazi v. Cullman Medical Ctr., 838 F.2d 1155 (11th Cir. 1988).
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privileges. The Eleventh Circuit accepted the district court's conclusion
that the physician was not a hospital employee." 4 The court, however,
also acknowledged the physician had entered into an employment contract
with another physician which was contingent upon his obtaining staff
privileges at the defendant hospital.'75 Therefore, applying the Spirides
hybrid test, the Pardazicourt concluded that if the physician could prove
the hospital's discrimination against him interfered in his employment
opportunity with another physician, Title VII would encompass the
physician's claim. 76 Thus, the Pardazidecision adds to other holdings that

have found that a hospital can interfere with a physician's employment
opportunities with third parties such as patients.
ADA CLAIMS IN STAFF PRIVILEGES CASES
Although staff privileges cases involving ADA claims are not as numerous
as those involving Title VII actions, the ADA cases reported thus far
involve many of the same issues that are present in their Title VII
counterparts. Two recent cases, in particular, raise questions regarding
application of the ADA's provisions to the determination of whether a
physician is an employee of a health care entity.'" In Reigel v. Kaiser
Found.Health Plan of North Carolina,the federal district court held a

health plan was a separate and distinct entity from a medical group that
employed the plaintiff physician.' The physician brought an ADA action
against the medical group that formerly employed her, challenging her
termination. Because the physician had an employment agreement with the
medical group, the court did not have to struggle with the issue of
whether an employment relationship existed between the two parties for

'74

Id. at 1156.

175

Id.

176 Id.

"7 See Elbrecht v. HCA Health Servs. of Florida, No, 93-1013, 1994 US. Dist LEXS I SS77
(ND. Fa Sep. 26, 1994); Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of North Carolina, 859 F. Supp. 963
(E.D.N.C. 1994). See also Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F3d 1446, 1460-61 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that physician seeking admission to hospital's pediatric residency program xas not entitled
to preliminary injunction because he failed to show some likelihood of sucez on his ADA,
Rehabilitation Act, and retaliation claims).
"T Reigel, 859 F. Supp. at 966.
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purposes of the plaintiffs ADA claim. The physician, however, included
the health plan among her named defendants even though she had never
enjoyed any contractual relationship with the health plan or submitted any
correspondence to the health plan concerning her employment status with
the medical group. Based on this obvious lack of relationship with the
health plan on the part of the physician, the court granted the defendant
health plan's motion for summary judgment." 9

Although the Reigel decision appears to be relatively straightforward,
it raises some possible warning signs for managed care entities that either
employ physicians directly or contract with physician groups for the
provision of medical services. Courts considering a tenuous employment
relationship between a health plan and a physician could look to established
precedent in staff privileges cases involving Title VII claims. Based on this
precedent, a court that reads provisions of the ADA broadly might be
inclined to establish an employment relationship between a health plan and
a physician where one only tenuously exists, thereby creating liability for
the plan based on some remote relationship with a physician. Because of
the inconsistency and confusion generated by staff privileges cases
involving Title VII claims, there are few assurances for health plans that
courts will not find an employment relationship between a plan and a
physician, no matter how unlikely such a relationship seems.
In another staff privileges case involving an ADA claim, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Florida held that the facts
presented at trial conclusively established that the plaintiff physician was
not an employee of either the hospital or her patients, but was in fact an
independent contractor.' The plaintiff in Elbrecht v HCA Health Services
of Florida,brought an ADA, Title I claim after the defendant hospital
effectively terminated her staff privileges. To reach its decision, the court
applied the Spirideshybrid test and found that "the plaintiffs unequivocal
responses [left] no room for interpretation other than" one that the
physician was not the employee of her patients.181 Furthermore, the court
concluded that the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Pardazi was not

179
'
'

Id.
See Elbrecht v.HCA Health Servs. of Florida, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18877 at *6-7.
Id. at *7.
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controlling because Pardazi involved a situation in which the plaintiff
physician had already entered into an employment contract with another
physician." Therefore, the court granted the defendant hospital's motion
for a directed verdict on the plaintiffs ADA claim' 83
Although the Elbrechtdecision is currently on appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit, the district court decision provides some important points for
consideration. First, the court applied the Spirides hybrid test to determine
whether an employment relationship exists. Second, the court
distinguished its case from the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Pardazi. Both
of these points indicate that courts will look to previous Title VII staff
privileges case law when faced with an ADA claim in a staff privileges
case. They also reemphasize that federal district courts are not inclined to
follow precedent in such cases and the confusion and the inconsistency
inherent in the body of Title VII staff privileges cases is very likely to carry
over when courts are adjudicating ADA claims.
CONCLUSION
Staff privileges cases involving the issue of whether a staff physician is an
employee of a hospital for Title VII purposes have produced a variety of
legal approaches and conclusions. Because of this, litigants in staff
privileges cases involving an employment discrimination claim may be left
to guess what standard (i.e. the hybrid test, the "economic realities" test,
or right to control test) a federal court will apply, as well as to how a court
will apply the standard it selects. With the advent of managed care, as well
as increasing cost competition within the health care industry, it is very
likely there could be an explosion of staff privileges cases involving
employment discrimination claims in the near future, as both hospitals and
health plans seek to streamline their operations and cut costs. When future
litigants and courts look to the myriad of staff privileges case law involving
Title VII claims, they will find anything but a clear, concise body of law on
which to draw a solution in their own cases.
As an alternative to this morass of confusing and inconsistent case

2

Id. at *8.

"' Id. at *8-9.
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law, there is perhaps, a more efficient, uniform, and fact-specific legal
framework which could be applied to staff privileges cases involving
employment discrimination claims. As indicated above, the ky element of
both the "right to control test" and the Spirides hybrid test is an employer's
right to control an employee's work and performance. Furthermore, the
economic realities test focuses on the economic dependence of an alleged
employee on an alleged employer. Thus, under the economic realities test,
the critical inquiry relates to the degree of economic dependence an
employee has on an employer, or in other words, the degree of control an
employer can assert over an employee because of the employee's economic
dependence upon his job or position.
Therefore, any alternative legal framework should be premised upon
the degree of control a hospital asserts over a physician's ability to practice
medicine. The first question a federal court should ask in such cases then
is whether the physician has medical staff privileges at only one hospital,
or more than one hospital. Obviously, if a physician enjoys privileges at
multiple hospitals, it will be more difficult for the hospital in.question to
control the physician's economic or employment opportunities. Thus,
based upon the answer to this initial inquiry, the alternative test employs
one oftwo frameworks for analyzing the issue of whether a physician is a
hospital employee, or has an employment relationship with the hospital for
Title VII purposes.
Physicians with staff privileges at only one hospital:
If the physician in question has privileges at only one hospital, the first
consideration a court should focus on is whether the physician has an
exclusive provider contract with the hospital. In conjunct on with this
initial inquiry, courts should also take into account the area in which the
physician specializes. Radiologists, pathologists, and anesthesiologists
often have exclusive provider contracts with hospitals. These three
specialty areas are particularly susceptible to an over-crowded and highly
competitive health care market, and therefore, specialists in these areas
may have no choice but to sign an exclusive provider contract with a
hospital in order to ensure a continuing source of patients. Furthermore,
specialists in these areas most likely do not maintain a separate medical
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practice on which they can rely for a steady stream of patients. Thus, if a
physician has an exclusive provider contract with a hospital, specializes in
the area of pathology, radiology, or anesthesiology, and does not maintain
a separate medical practice, it is very likely that the hospital has the ability
to control the physician's employment opportunities.
If the physician in question does not have an exclusive provider
contract with the hospital in question, the next inquiry in a court's analysis
should be whether the physician maintains a separate, private practice, As
part of this inquiry, courts also should incorporate elements of the Spirides
hybrid test and look for other sources of an employment relationship
between the physician and the hospital. Examples of fact specific questions
which a court could apply in its analysis include: (1) whether there is a
recruitment contract between the physician and the hospital, (2) whether
the hospital rents or provides office space to a physician at a reduced rental
rate or at no cost to the physician; (3) whether the hospital used some sort
of minimum salary guarantee in order to attract the physician to the
hospital's stafF, and (4) whether the hospital has exclusive control over the
equipment and facilities used by the physician to practice medicine.
Physicians who do maintain separate medical practices will most likely
have a steady income/patient stream which is not dependent upon their
medical staff privileges. However, courts should not simply assume that
because a physician maintains a separate practice that a hospital does not
in any way control the physician's employment opportunities If the
hospital rents or provides office space, equipment, or facilities to the
physician at lower than market rate rental value, and ties the provision of
such space to the physician's maintenance of staff privileges, then the
termination of the physician's privileges could definitely affect the
physician's ability to maintain his separate practice. Additionally, although
a physician may operate a separate practice, if a large percentage of the
physician's account receivables result from admissions to the hospital
where the physician has his only set of staff privileges, termination of the
physician's privileges could spell financial disaster for the physician.
Therefore, a court should not only be aware of the amount of a physician's
business which results from admissions to a particular hospital, but should
also factor this analysis into its final determination of whether a staff
physician is a hospital employee for Title VII purposes.
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Finally, the last inquiry for a court in cases where a physician has
privileges at only one hospital, is whether the hospital, the physician, or
both are part of a managed care network, as well as the effect that a
negative staff privileges determination would have on the physician's
relationship with such a network. If a physician's contract within a
managed care network is tied in any way to the maintenance of the
physician's staff privileges at a particular hospital, then the termination of
the physician's privileges would also result in the physician's ex:pulsion from
the network. Therefore, courts considering whether a staff physician is an
employee of a particular hospital, must take into account whether, and to
what extent, the physician and the hospital are part of a managed care
network. Moreover, if a large percentage of the physician's business or
patient stream comes from one managed care network, and a hospital is in
a position to determine whether the physician can maintain his membership
in the network, then courts must apply this consideration to their analysis
of whether an employment relationship exists between the physician and
the hospital.
Physicians with staff privileges at more than one hospital:
When a physician has privileges at more than one hospital, a court's
analysis of whether the physician is an employee of a hospital that
terminates the physician's privileges is essentially the same -.s its analysis
when the physician has privileges at only one hospital. Courts should
consider whether the physician maintains a separate practice, whether the
physician and hospital in question are part of a managed care network, and
whether there are any other factors (i.e. recruitment contracts, provision
of office space or equipment, or minimum salary guarantees) which might
aid the court's analysis.
There are, however, three important differences between the
analytical frameworks. First, by definition, exclusive provider contracts
will not apply in situations where a physician has staff privileges at multiple
hospitals. Second, a court should be particularly sensitive to the
percentage of a physician's business which results from having privileges
at the hospital which terminated the privileges. For example, if the
percentage of a physician's practice at the hospital in questioa is less than
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10 to 15 percent of the physician's business, it could be possible that the
hospital has little control over the physician's employment. If the
percentage is higher, however, a court might have to scrutinize the parties'
relationship more closely before making such a determination.
Finally, in multiple staff privileges cases, the National Practitioner
Data Bank ('rNPDB") could play a significant role in determining whether

an employment relationship exists between the parties for Title VII
purposes. HCQIA requires hospitals to report any negative staff privileges
determinations to the NPDB.18 4 HCQIA also requires hospitals to check
the NPDB before granting a physician staff privileges.' Thus, negative
entries in the NPDB could definitely influence a hospital's decision to grant
a physician privileges. When a physician has privileges at only one
hospital, a NPDB entry only affects the physician's opportunities to obtain
future staff privileges. By comparison, when a physician has privileges at
multiple hospitals, a NPDB entry could affect the physician's current
relationship with other hospitals. While in the former scenario courts could
conclude that the hospital in question had interfered with the physician's
future ability to practice medicine (particularly when the physician's
medical specialty is pathology, radiology, or anesthesiology), courts
analyzing the latter situation could conclude that the hospital had interfered
with identifiable staff privileges relationships which the physician enjoyed
at other hospitals. Therefore, while a court should include the possibility
ofa NPDB entry as part of its analysis in either situation, the court might
give greater consideration to this factor in multiple staff privileges cases
where such an entry would affect a physician's established employment
opportunities, rather than future, perhaps intangible, opportunities.
Like the "right to control," the economic realities test, and Spirides
hybrid test, this proposed alternative analytical framework is premised
upon the hospital or employer's right to control an alleged employee's
employment opportunities. Unlike, these three tests, however, courts do
not have to engage in a subjective balancing test to reach a conclusion.
Rather, courts should use this alternative framework in a progressive
fashion, applying each of the specific inquiries in the order described

1
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above."l 6 Each inquiry provides a logical breaking point for a court which
is attempting to decide whether a physician is a hospital employee for Title
VII purposes. Thus, this alternative test is intended to provide a more
manageable legal framework, as well as more consistent results, when

applied to future staff privileges cases involving federal employment
discrimination claims. In the overlapping cross section between the often
complex area of federal employment discrimination law and today's highly

competitive and rapidly changing health care market, such a framework is
necessary in order to avoid what could otherwise be inequitable and
precipitous judicial decisions for both physicians and hospitals alike.

'

For instance, if a physician has privileges at only one hospital, the court should structure its

analysis as follows: (1) Is there an exclusive provider contract? (2) If so what is the physician's area
of medical specialty? (3) Does the physician maintain an independent practice? (4) If so, are there
other considerations such as minimum salary guarantees, provision of space and/or equipment by the
hospital, etc.? (5) Are the parties involved in a managed care network, and to what extent does the
physician rely on his involvement for his professional and financial well-being?
If the situation involves multiple staff privileges then the analysis is the tame, except that
element (1) is not a consideration, and instead, courts should consider the effect a NPDB entry will
have on the physician's career/business opportunities, and also, should scrutinize more closely the
percentage of the physician's revenues derived from the particular hospital which te-minated his staff
privileges.

